Onur Alp Yılmaz wrote: “Kenya, Kenya… What’s going on in the world?”

As you know, the quote in the title is from Cem Yılmaz's famous jokes...

Now everyone at the UN has a headset. One country's representative speaks, the others listen. France speaks, Kenya listens… No one translates for Ghana… (Referring to Ghana) What's going on… Kenya, what's happening in Kenya… What's happening in the world…

I think this is exactly how the opposition, which expects us to obey it absolutely, looks at the world… The world, to borrow a concept from earthquake science, is literally shaken by seismic impacts every day.

These seismic shocks literally move countries, bringing them closer together or pushing them apart. We are in a struggle over whether we will transition from the unipolar world that emerged with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union to a multipolar world, or not.

We are in a state of anarchy, where international rules and institutions are neither recognized nor inadequate. We are in what is known in international relations literature as the "self-help" era, where everyone is desperate to save themselves. In other words, we are in the "every man for himself" era.

So, will order emerge from this? Will we ever return to a state of relative international peace? What will be the rules of this new world? We are in an era of international politics where these questions remain unclear, where the law of the jungle prevails. As Sezen Aksu said, " This is a conflagration of an era; the whole world is sinful."

How? Russia hit a wall in the Ukraine War. This emboldened former Soviet republics like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia, who initially harbored concerns about the Caucasus region, Russia's former domain. This courage, in turn, led them to seek to break free from Russia's sphere of influence by establishing relations with the West. Readers of this column will recall that in recent weeks, I stated that these countries' pursuits coincided with the West's quest to curb Russia's influence in the region, and that they had assigned three countries key roles in this endeavor: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

This is precisely the outcome of the situation we witnessed at the White House: Azerbaijan and Armenia ended their 30-year war with an agreement signed under Trump's patronage. Another point in this agreement, as historic as the cessation of war, was the stipulation that US companies would operate the Zangezur Corridor, which would establish the US along the Iranian border, for 99 years. So, how did Armenia surrender this region, one of the main causes of the years-long Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict and a region it had previously refused to cede to Russia despite its previous demands, to US sovereignty?

As I mentioned above, Armenia and Azerbaijan are seeking, with Western support, to rid themselves of Russia's reckless stance against their sovereign rights. However, there is a very strong pro-Russian opposition in Armenia. This means that a pro-Russian uprising, or even a coup, could occur in the country at any time.

In such an initiative, in a world where "everyone hangs for himself," there must be a response to the US's willingness to engage in conflict with Russia "for Armenia ," right? Neighboring Iran through Zangezur must be a quite satisfactory compromise for US and Israeli interests. Indeed, attentive readers of this column will recall how Israel believed it could encircle Iran with its "Greater Azerbaijan" dream and how it has long marketed Azerbaijan to the US in this direction . Therefore, the losers of this agreement, as it currently stands, will be Iran, Russia, and China, whose trade routes have been cut off.

As I said at the beginning of this article, in this period when international institutions and rules are dysfunctional, tradesman-style bargaining, new alliances, and collaborations will continue. The US's goal is clear: to maintain its hegemonic power in the global system by countering China's Belt and Road with the Trump Road project . To this end, we, Turkey, are at the intersection of the geographies where this struggle is taking place.

When we consider this perspective, the following question immediately arises: Is the "Terror-Free Turkey" initiative launched by the government exempt from all these negotiations? As a liar of the international media, I'll say, "Of course not." So, what else does the international media say? For example, they say that Turkey will assist the US in disarming Hezbollah in Lebanon and, in return, request assistance in eliminating the PKK. Some take this even further, basing it on the arming of Hamas. Can we say, "No way," to all this? Especially since, in an interview with HaberTürk, Barrack, excluding Iran and Russia, laid out his new vision for the Middle East and the Caucasus as follows:

Just think about combining the Abraham Accords with Turkey, one of the region's strongest players—a country whose importance in the region is increasing every day. But not just Turkey; Turkey, a country with a predominantly Muslim non-Arab population, Israel, the Gulf, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and, to the north, Azerbaijan and Armenia… When you combine these, the world's most powerful region emerges. Why not?

Has anyone heard the opposition's views on this approach, which clearly equates the Israeliization of the Middle East with making it safe for the US? Or its alternative plan? Furthermore, according to the opposition, is this US aggression a threat to Turkey?

So, in such a conjuncture, in an equation where the elimination of the PKK is reduced to international bargaining, will the commission established serve any purpose other than aligning politics in Turkey with the title of "Turkey Without Terrorism" ?

This question honestly brings to mind a moment from the miniseries "Hitler: The Rise of Evil." The series also explored the propaganda methods Hitler employed until he became an irrevocable dictator. There's a moment from this series that sticks with me: when Hitler was passing the war budget in Germany, the SPD members who were about to vote "no" suddenly stood up in a comma-like fashion when the national anthem played. Just as the national anthem was instrumentalized in that scenario to rally the opposition, I can't help but wonder if the same thing is happening here today with "Turkey Without Terror."

Indeed, sitting at the table under the pretense of "transparency of the process," and then supporting the government's decision to hold a closed session at its very first meeting, excluding the first meeting where the commission's working principles were determined, on the grounds of a presentation by the security bureaucracy, falls squarely on this point. In this process, where there are no rules and negotiations take place daily at the leadership level, the moment the issue is discussed through a closed session presentation by the security bureaucracy, it becomes a matter not of democratization but of national security. Therefore, wouldn't leaving this table constitute " acting irresponsibly despite knowing 'big' secrets and the 'state's mind' that cannot be shared with the public" ? Wouldn't this be promoted?

So, considering all these interconnected developments that I mentioned above, which are all part of maintaining the US's hegemonic power, is there a Kurdish issue for Erdoğan, Bahçeli, and Öcalan that is free from Türkiye's role in the region, and the negotiations and closed-door diplomacy it engages in with Israel, the US, Armenia, and Azerbaijan?

Or more importantly, is there a Kurdish problem for these actors? If so, for which ones? And where do the minimum democratic demands such as democratization, welfare, interregional income distribution justice, and the spread of wealth and property to the grassroots stand among the solutions?

At this point, isn't this process in conflict with the CHP's historical claim that the Kurdish issue, which stems from poverty, lack of democracy, the presence of racist tendencies within the political culture, income inequality between regions, the state's misconduct, and the rejectionist attitude towards Kurds, and which provides a social base for terrorism, also conflicts with the anti-imperialism inherent in the CHP's founding codes, by taking steps to resolve all these issues?

Or isn't there a conflict between the CHP's claim of "defending the Palestinian cause, a legacy from Ecevit," which it frequently emphasizes, and what is happening?

Indeed, we all witness how the government has, at different times, aligned various opposition groups with various moral categories like "Yenikapı spirit," "Native and nationalist," and "Refugees and Ensars." So much so that, while the government, which until recently accused the opposition of terrorism for its ties to the Democratic People's Party (DEM), now finds the opposition strange for not sanctifying Abdullah Öcalan.

Undoubtedly, these two seemingly opposing strategies share a common ground: designing the political landscape for greater authoritarianism and the exercise of power for life. Indeed, no matter what happens, there is no such thing as war, no matter what happens, there is no such thing as peace. How war and peace are achieved, for what purposes, and under what conditions, is crucial.

The process being marketed as "peace" today is one in which Öcalan becomes a key figure in exchange for Erdoğan maintaining his power domestically, while the US is preparing for a larger war to maintain its hegemonic power in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Furthermore, this will not be viewed with pleasure by Russia, Iran, or China, and will undoubtedly find a response. In this equation, neither confining the opposition to the commission nor saying "the exact opposite of what the AK Party says" is a solution. We need to hear how the opposition interprets the world, what risks and advantages it sees in the near future, and how this relates to domestic policy. Otherwise, it will be impossible to compete with Erdoğan on this platform, where he has shifted the political discourse from domestic to foreign policy.

In short, we are no longer in a period where we need an opposition stuck in its comfort zone in Ankara, unwilling to share these spaces with anyone and therefore hindering all productive capacity, asking, "Kenya, Kenya, what's happening in the world?" Instead, we need a completely new founding narrative and a capable and founding cadre. Because whoever establishes this narrative, whoever possesses the ideological stock, will determine the future.